DEDUCTIBILITY OF LEGAL EXPENSES INCURRED
IN CORPORATE STOCK REDEMPTIONS,
PARTIAL LIQUIDATIONS, AND
SEPARATIONS
J. TIMOTHY PHILIPPS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A substantial consideration for any corporation preparing to undergo a change in its organizational structure is the treatment for federal income tax purposes of the legal fees' incurred in developing and
implementing the plan of alteration. Typically, the company will attempt to characterize these fees as "ordinary and necessary business
expenses" in order to deduct the amount from its gross income in the
year the fees are paid, under section 162 of the Internal Revenue
Code.' The federal government, on the other hand, will generally
argue that such structural adjustments benefit the corporation for a period beyond the taxable year, and that the expenses attendant thereto
are more properly treated as capital investment. 3 Given the importance of this determination to corporate planning, it is surprising that
the law remains unsettled with respect to such relatively common trans* Professor of Law, West Virginia University. B.S. 1962, Wheeling College; J.D.
1965, Georgetown University; LL.M. 1966, Harvard University.
1. Although most of the authorities discussed in this Article deal with legal expenses, the principles involved are also generally applicable to other costs attendant to
a corporate restructuring, such as accountants' fees.
2. There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business .

. .

. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).

Corporate counsel will also be interested in having his fees characterized as deductible
expenses since this will amount to a federal subsidy of his bill to the extent of the corporate tax rate.
3. Section 263 (a) (1) of the Code denies a deduction for "[any amount paid out
. . . for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property .. . . "
Expenditures which must be capitalized can, however, be used to reduce taxable income either by depreciation, if the asset has a determinable life, section 167(a)(1), or
by increasing the basis which will be used in determining gain or loss upon subsequent
disposition of the asset. Sections 165(a), 165(c)(1)(2). See McDonald, Deduction of
Attorneys' Fees for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 168 (1954); Note,
The Deductibility of Attorneys' Fees, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1409-12 (1961). See generally Krane, Deducting Legal and Accounting Fees: Selected Problems, 44 TAxes 7
(1966); Note, The Characterization of Legal Fees as Deductible Expenses or Capital
Expenditures-A Need for Clarificationin the Law, 21 SYmcusE L. REv. 926 (1970).
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actions as stock redemptions, partial liquidations, and corporate separations.
The most common approach taken by the courts in deteimining
the deductibility of legal expenses incurred in a stock redemption or
partial liquidation is to seek an analogy to some other kind of transac4
tion for which the tax treatment of attendant expenses is more certain.
More specifically, the courts have attempted in each case to determine
whether the particular transaction more closely resembles a corporate
reorganization, the expenses of which require capitalization, 5 or a complete corporate liquidation, the expenses of which are immediately de-

ductible.0 Unfortunately, the case law which has developed through
4. This group of cases has been termed the "partial liquidation" line. D. HERWrrz, BUSINESS PLANNING 540-43 (1966). See DeCastro, Recent Cases Show Liberal
Trend in Allowing Deductions for Legal Fees, 23 J. TAX. 224, 227 (1965).
5. See B. BITKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

OF CORPORATIONS AND

SHAREHOLDERS ff 5.07 (3d ed. 1971); Maier, Deductibility of Expenses Incurred in Corporate Reorganizations and Liquidations, U. So. CAL. 1968 TAX INST. 253, 254-58;
Weissman, Allowable Deductions on the Formation, Reorganization and Liquidation of
a Corporation,53 Nw. U.L. REV. 681, 687-702 (1959); Winokur, Deductibility of Legal
Expenses and Other ProfessionalFees, U. So. CAL. 1963 TAX INST. 457, 461-64.
The capitalization requirement for reorganization expenses is consistent with and
derived from the rule that expenses incurred in organizing a corporation are capital expenditures. Estate of George B. Leonard Holding Corp., 26 B.T.A. 46, 47 (1932); Appeat of F. Tinker & Sons Co., 1 B.T.A. 799, 803 (1925). The rationale for current
nondeductibility of organization and reorganization expenses appears to be that the corporation by such expenditures acquires an intangible asset, the cost of which in matching
revenues and expenditures cannot properly be charged to the revenues of any one year,
because it has a useful life coexistent with the indefinite life of the corporation itself.
Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 1953). See D. HERwlrz, supra note 4, at 540-41; 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

25.35, at 174 (rev. ed. 1972). Such expenses are deductible as losses when the corporate existence is terminated, since at that time the intangible asset is of no further value.
Malta Temple Ass'n, 16 B.T.A. 409 (1929). In addition, a corporation can elect to
amortize its organization expenses (but not reorganization expenses) over a period of
five years. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 248.
6. Lanrao, Inc. v. United States, 422 F.2d 481 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
928 (1970); United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., 365 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1966); Commissioner v.
Wayne Coal Mining Co., 209 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1954); United States v. Arcade Co.,
203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953); Rite-Way Prods., Inc., 12
T.C. 475 (1949), acquiesced in, 1949-2 CuM. BULL. 3; Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 32
B.T.A. 39 (1935), acquiesced in, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 6; see J. MERTENS, supra note 5,
25.35, at 182; Winokur, supra note 4, at 464-66.
Two rationales have been advanced for the current deductibility of liquidation expenses. In Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935), the court stated that "liquidation and dissolution are in the nature of a final accounting of the results of the taxpayer's business rendered to its stockholders and the state." Id. at 43. This rationale
appears entirely adequate when one considers the reason for requiring that certain expenditures be capitalized: accurate accounting requires that revenues and expenditures
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the use of these analogies is inconsistent and often poorly reasoned. 7

It is the contention of this Article that this result is directly attributable
to the uncertainty inherent in the analogizing process, and that the analogy principle should therefore be discarded in favor of a functional
approach to the particular circumstances of each case.
A stock redemption, for example, is analogous to a reorganization
in that it is generally accompanied by a change in the corporate capital
structure as a result of the reduction in the number of outstanding
shares. A legitimate comparison can also be made with a complete
liquidation, however, since a distribution of corporate assets is a principal component of both transactions. The fundamental difficulty is apparent: because there is no convincing basis for choosing between the
be appropriately matched during the existence of an ongoing enterprise. When the enterprise has terminated, there is obviously no further need for such matching.
Later cases, however, developed a somewhat different rationale, emphasizing that
no tangible or intangible asset is acquired when expenditures are made in connection
with a complete liquidation. See, e.g., United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed
Co., 365 F.2d 244, 245 (10th Cir. 1966). As one commentator has pointed out, this
second rationale, since it is not based upon the matching principle, does not require a
complete termination of corporate activity and is therefore applicable to a partial liquidation situation. Cohen, The Deductibility of Stock Redemption Expenses, 24 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 431, 439 n.47 (1973).
7. Some of the difficulty experienced by the courts can be attributed to the semantic confusion caused by a revision of the Code sections dealing with the treatment of
a shareholder's gain or loss upon the repurchase of his shares by the issuer. Under the
1939 Code, shareholders were afforded "sale or exchange" treatment (resulting in a capital gain or loss) on "amounts distributed in partial liquidation."

INT. REV. CODE OF

1939, § 115(c). A "partial liquidation" was defined simply as
a distribution by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of a
part of its stock, or one of a series of distributions in complete cancellation or
redemption of all or a portion of its stock. Id., § 115(i).
This single section, therefore, encompassed both pro rata and non-pro rata stock repurchases.
The 1954 Code, however, treats "stock redemptions" as distinct from "partial liquidations." Section 302, captioned "Distributions in Redemption of Stock," essentially
provides that a non-pro rata distribution shall be deemed a "sale or exchange" of the
shareholder's stock. Section 346, on the other hand, is labelled "Partial Liquidations
Defined," and primarily governs pro rata stock repurchases (although some non-pro rata
distributions are also covered). "Sale or exchange" treatment is given only to those repurchases which result in a corporate contraction. See B. BrrrxnR & J. EuslcE, supra
note 4, at 9-45 to 9-57.
There has been some indication that the courts, relying on the analogy to liquidations, are moving toward limiting the deductibility of expenses incurred in stock repurchases to those transactions which qualify as "partial liquidations." See, e.g., Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Cohen, supra
note 6, at 487-88. Neither section 302 nor section 346, however, makes mention of the
proper treatment of the expenses incident to the transactions they govern, and it will
be argued herein that, for the purpose of determining such treatment, "partial liquidations" and "stock redemptions" are essentially similar. See text accompanying notes 8287 infra.
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available analogies, the result in any particular case cannot be predicted
with confidence.
This Article will first examine the leading cases in which the analogy approach has been used in order to illustrate the problems which
have arisen. Next, an alternative approach used in a limited number
of cases and arguably sanctioned by the Supreme Court will be discussed. Finally, a revised method for dealing with the question will
be proposed, emphasizing the need for courts to redirect their attention
to the process of "matching" corporate expenditures with the revenues
which these expenditures produce.8 It is believed that closer scrutiny
of the functional aspects of a restructuring will lead to a more realistic
assessment of its impact on the corporation. In the long term, the
application of such scrutiny in individual cases will foster the development of more consistent general rules.
11".THE ANALOGY APPROACH:
APPLICATION IN THE CASES

The primary question posed by most courts in attempting to determine the deductibility of the legal expenses of a particular transaction
is whether the transaction more closely resembles a complete liquida-

tion or a corporate reorganization. In a line of court of appeals cases,
the analogy approach was utilized to determine the tax treatment of
expenses incurred in each of the transactions under consideration here:
partial liquidations, stock redemptions, and corporate separations.
The first such case was Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner9 in

which a corporation withdrew from one of its principal activities, the
management of real estate, by selling the property and distributing the
proceeds pro rata to its shareholders. The mechanics of the plan involved the distribution of cash to the shareholders in exchange for part
of their stock, the amendment of the corporate charter to reduce the
authorized stock by the amount retired on the exchange, and the issuance of new capital stock under the amended charter in exchange for
the remaining capital stock outstanding. 10 The corporate taxpayer de8. This matching process, whereby revenues realized during a specified period are
reduced by the costs of operation applicable to that period, is a fundamental principle
of accounting and provides the primary rationale for the sections of the Code dealing
with deductions and capital expenditures. See E. FAMs, AccouNT.o FOR LAWYERS 69,
75-85, 345-46 (rev. student ed. 1964); W. KARRENBROCK & H. SIMONS, INTERMEDIATE
AcCOUNTING 6-7 (1958); J. MERTENS, supra note 5, %25.35 at 173-74.
9. 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'g in part 17 T.C. 910 (1951); see Comment,
Attorneys' Fees for Partial Liquidation: Business Expense or Capital Asset?, 6 STAN.
L. REv.368 (1954).
10. See Mills Estate, Inc., 17 T.C. 910, 911-12 (1951).
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ducted the legal fees incident to this plan as an "ordinary and necessary
business expense" under section 162 of the Code."1

The Tax Court

allowed only part of the legal expenses to be deducted, allocating them
between capital expenditures and currently deductible items.' 2
Amounts attributable to amending the charter and reducing the authorized capital stock were considered to be capital expenditures by analogy to reorganization costs, since they provided for the acquisition and
retirement of outstanding stock.

However, amounts attributable to

"the actual distribution of assets in partial liquidation" were held deductible by virtue of the similarity between such distribution and a com-

plete liquidation.' 3
The Second Circuit reversed. 14 Although it disapproved of the
allocation of expenses, the court did not suggest that the Tax Court

had been incorrect in attempting to draw a parallel between the instant
transaction and either a reorganization or a liquidation.'5 Making its
own application of the analogy principle, the Second Circuit reached
an opposite result, concluding that the corporation had undergone "a
recapitalization to give itself a capital structure it determined was best

suited to carrying on that part of the business it was to continue." This
altered capital structure was viewed as an intangible asset which would

be of long-term benefit to the corporation; consequently, the expenses
incurred in undertaking this transaction had to be capitalized.' 6
11. See note 2 supra.
12. 17 T.C. at 915. The Tax Court had allowed expenses of repurchase transactions on an allocated basis in some prior cases. See, e.g., Tobacco Prods. Export Corp.,
18 T.C. 1100 (1952), not acquiesced in, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 11 (§ 346 type pro rata
distribution). Following the reversal of its decision in Mills Estate by the Second Circuit, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953), however, the Tax Court was considerably less
amenable to this approach. See, e.g., Farmers Union Corp., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
941 (1960), af'd, 300 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1962); Standard Linen Service, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1 (1959), acquiesced in, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 7; Cohen, supra
note 6, at 434-36. But see Stephen L. Morrow, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1222, 1243-44
(1967) (intimating that a portion of the expenses of a bootstrap redemption would be
deductible if the court were able to allocate expenses between the redemption and the
immediate resale of the stock).
13. 17 T.C. at 915. Although the taxpayer had apparently not provided proof upon
which to sustain an allocation, the court allowed one on the authority of Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), treating one half as a deductible expense and
the other half as a nondeductible capital expenditure. 17 T.C. at 915. A dissent argued
that all of the expenditures were "incident to the reorganization of a continuing corporation" and therefore capital expenditures. Id. (Turner, J., dissenting).
14. 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953).
15. Id. at 246.
16. Id. The court did not explicitly acknowledge its reliance on the analogy principle, nor did it elaborate on its conclusions, which were presented in summary fashion.
Nonetheless, the essence of the opinion was clearly the rejection of the analogy drawn
by the Tax Court and the substitution of that favored by the reviewing court.
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The Mills Estate court's premise that the expenses of a transaction
which results in the corporation's acquisition of a durable asset must
be capitalized is a matter of established law,17 and its treatment of the
altered capital structure as such an asset initially appears reasonable.
By holding that the presence of such an alteration is determinative of
the matter, however, the court seems to have lost sight of the fact that
the transaction caused the corporation to be divested of a considerable
portion of its assets.' 8 It is quite possible that whatever long-term benefits were derived from the restructuring were offset by this contraction
of the firm's activities. The court could just as reasonably have concluded that the transaction was in effect a "liquidation" of a portion
of the company and that the restructuring of capital was merely incidental to this change. It is the presence of such uncertainty which
causes the most concern to tax planners.
The next case in this line of authority was Gravois Planing Mill
Co. v. Commissioner,'9 in which legal expenses were incurred in developing a plan for the withdrawal of a majority shareholder from the
business.20 Under the plan finally agreed upon, the retiring share17. See United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 956 (1958):
(Ain expenditure should be treated as one in the nature of a capital outlay if
it brings about the acquisition of an asset having a period of useful life in
excess of one year, or if it secures a like advantage to the taxpayer which has
a life of more than one year.
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2 (1958); J. MERTENs, supra note 5, at 25.26.
18. The court in fact stated that whether or not the transaction qualified as a "partial liquidation" under section 115(i) of the 1939 Code was irrelevant. 206 F.2d at 246.
19. 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962), rev'g 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 639 (1960).
20. The majority shareholder had consulted the same attorneys about the transaction
and arguably some of their services could have been construed as having been rendered
for his personal benefit. However, the court found "nothing in this record to justify
a conclusion that any part of these was for the benefit of [the *majority shareholder]
personally." 299 F.2d at 209. This was in spite of an explicit finding of fact by the
Tax Court that part of the attorney's charge had been for rendering advice to the retiring
shareholder. 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 643. This illustrates a potentially difficult
questin-for whom are the services of the attorney rendered in such a circumstance?
Certainly the attorney handling the transaction would have to determine the tax effects
on the retiring shareholder, often the most significant single consequence of a redemption. The services may be characterized as for the shareholder's benefit, and the costs
therefore not deductible by the corporation (if it pays the fee) because incurred for the
benefit of another. See J. Gordon Turnbull, 41 T.C. 358 (1963), afrd, 373 F.2d 91
(9th Cir. 1967). On the other hand, there are also serious legal ramifications for the
corporation in a redemption. Query whether the attorney should allocate his fee, charging part to the corporation and part to the redeemed shareholder? This raises the possibility of deduction of the legal fee by the shareholder under section 212. At least one
case has allowed such a deduction in similar circumstances. Kauffmann v. United
States, 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963). In Gravois, the court seemed to gloss over
the whole question, assuming that all the services were rendered for the corporation, apparently even those attributable to determining tax consequences to the redeemed share-
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holder sold some of his shares to one of the three remaining shareholders in order to equalize their holdings. The residue was sold to the
corporation in exchange for cash and various items of real and personal
property. The retiring shareholder then leased the real property back
to the corporation.21
The Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by then Judge Blackmun, al-

lowed the deduction of the expenses incident to the transaction.2 2 The
court acknowledged that the stock redemption was accompanied by a
change in the corporation's capital structure and that this factor argued
for capitalization of the expenses.2
Viewing the transaction as a
whole, however, the court found that:
the dominant aspect . . .was the liquidation of the [majority stockholder's] shares and not the recapitalization. . . . Although there was,
of course, a desire on the part of all to keep the organization going,
the basic problem with which they struggled was that of the disposition of the outstanding [majority] stock and was not one directed to
the change or any desired improvement in the form of the corporate
structure. Stock retirement, that is, partial liquidation, was the prob24
lem and it was the essence of what transpired.
holder. Another problem raised by this situation is that the parties have adverse interests, presumably bargaining at arms' length over terms of the transaction, and an attorney handling the entire transaction would be under an obligation at least to advise the
parties of the potential conflict of interest. See ABA C No Ns oF PROFESSIONAL ETMCS
No. 5.
21. 299 F.2d at 201. The transaction came within the 1939 Code definition of
"partial liquidation," see note 7 supra, and would probably be treated as a section 302
stock redemption under the 1954 Code.
22. 299 F.2d at 206. The Tax Court, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 639 (1960), had accepted the Commissioner's argument that the charges were "capital expenditures made
in connection with the corporation's acquisition of part of its own shares of stock and
for amendment to its articles of incorporation to reflect the redemption of such stock."
Id. at 644. This argument appears to be similar to that accepted in cases such as Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, 36 T.C. 173 (1961), (see notes 56-58 infra and accompanying
text).
23. 299 F.2d at 208-09. The court analyzed four decisions: the lower and appellate
court opinions in Mills Estate, Inc., 17 T.C. 910 (1951), and 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.
1953); Tobacco Prods. Export Corp., 18 T.C. 1100 (1952), modified, 21 T.C. 625
(1954); and Standard Linen Serv., Inc., 33 T.C. 1 (1959). It then assumed that they
expressed the applicable law, which was stated as follows:
Legal fees and other expenses of a partial liquidation may be deductible,
within the statutory definition, as ordinary and necessary expenses paid in
carrying on the business. Mills Estate (Tax Court), Tobacco Products, Standard Linen. Where, however, a partial liquidation is accompanied by the cor- poration's recapitalization or reorganization, the transaction is to be viewed as
a whole and its dominant aspect is to govern the tax character of the expenditures. Mills Estate (2d Cir.), Standard Linen. Thus, where one has what is
essentially "a change in the corporate structure for the benefit of future operations," there is no deduction. Mills Estate (2d Cir.). 299 F.2d at 208.
See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
24. 299 F.2d at 209.
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As in Mills Estate, the Eighth Circuit adopted the analogy approach. The selection of the appropriate analogy, however, was predicated on an analysis which went beyond the initial finding that a reorganization in the form of an alteration in the firm's capital structure
had occurred.
But in spite of the depth of the analysis, the court's conclusion
that the transaction was more closely analogous to a liquidation is far
from self-evident. Although the corporation's assets were depleted to
the extent of the cash paid and the value of the property transferred,
the scope of the firm's corporate activity had not been materially diminished because of the sale and leaseback agreement with respect to the
real property. Moreover, the court's use of the term "liquidation" was
questionable in that the reference was apparently to the elimination
of the shareholder's stock and not to a disposal of corporate assets. 25
The Gravois opinion's potential for confusion could have been
minimized had the court simply stated as a general rule that the costs
of a redemption of a retiring shareholder's stock are ordinary and necessary business expenses. 26 Aside from the obvious appeal of a consistent approach, such a result would be entirely reasonable. In the
typical situation where a stockholder wishes to retire from a business,
the corporation derives no continuing long range benefit in the nature
of an asset from the transaction. It is merely enabled to continue in
operation without the retiring shareholder; indeed, the transaction quite
often takes place at the shareholder's behest, as it did in Gravois. Even
where the redemption occurs in order to remove a dissident shareholder, however, the transaction is basically one which is undertaken
to enable the corporation to continue in its normal operation, rather
than one which brings about an added benefit or improvement requiring capitalization.
Two cases have extended the analogy approach to the expenses
2
of corporate separationsY.
In United States v. TransamericaCorp.28
25. Id.
26. See text accompanying notes 82-84 infra.
27. A corporate separation is a device by which a corporation reduces the scope of
its activities by transferring a part of its assets to another corporation in exchange for
the stock of the transferee corporation. This stock is then distributed to the shareholders of the transferor corporation. A separation may be undertaken for a number of reasons, including compliance with legal restrictions on the firm's activities (e.g., antitrust
considerations), resolution of a dispute among the transferor corporation's shareholders,
or the achievement of management efficiencies. See J. MERTENS, supra note 5, 20.91;
Rubin & Midler, Split-Off and Split-Up Reorganizations, 17 FORDHAM L. Rv. 246
(1948). The Code contains provisions which enable both the transferor corporation and
its shareholders to avoid recognition of any gain realized on the exchange. INT. REV.
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and United States v. General,Bancshares Corp.,2 9 the taxpayer corpora-

tions acted to divest themselves of certain non-banking assets as required by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.30 Under provisions
of the Code enacted to facilitate compliance with the Act,3' the corporations transferred assets to newly formed subsidiaries and then distributed
the subsidiaries' stock pro rata to their shareholders, thereby effecting a
sepa ation of the prohibited assets.32
In each case, the court of appeals accepted the taxpayer's characterization of the transaction as a partial liquidation and, by analogy to
a complete liquidation, allowed the deduction.33 The courts reasoned
that, although the transaction did not fit within the framework of section 346 of the Code, it did involve corporate contraction, since substantial corporate assets had been divested by the taxpayer corporation.3 4 The original firm obtained no offsetting long-term benefit,
other than compliance with the law,35 since the transaction did not involve any change in its proportionate shareholder interests.
Once again, however, in grasping for a defensible analogy, the
courts overlooked the pragmatic significance of the transaction under
consideration. On the surface, the corporation in each case derived
no long-term benefit from the divestment and underwent a contraction
of its activities.

The courts concluded from these facts that the dom-

inant aspect of the transactions was a "partial liquidation."3"

Upon

CODE OF 1954, §§ 355, 361(a) and 368(a)(1)(D); see B. BrrrKER & J. EUsrIcE, supra
note 5, at 13.01-.15; 223-2d BNA TAX MGT. PORTFOr Os (1974).
28. 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968), affg 254 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
29. 388 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1968), affg 258 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
30. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1956), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1970).
31. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1101-03.
32. These tax free transactions were similar in nature to a corporate separation under § 368(a) (1) (D). See United States v. General Bancshares Corp., 388 F.2d 184,
189 (8th Cir. 1968); Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 504, 513 (N.D.
Cal. 1966), affd, 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968).
33. Transamerica, 392 F.2d at 523; Bancshzares, 388 F.2d at 191. The Commissioner had contended at the district court level of each case that the legal expenses of
effectuating these separations were capital expenditures, because the transactions were
in substance corporate reorganizations. Bancshares, 258 F. Supp. at 506; Transamerica,
254 F. Supp. at 507. The arguments presented in the text following note 36 infra reflect the Commissioner's reasoning.
34. In Bancshares, the court explicitly stated that the rule allowing deduction of expenses of a partial liquidation "is not limited only to those expenditures incident to a
distribution meeting the requirements of a section 346 partial liquidation." 388 F.2d
at 191.
35. The courts in both cases specifically noted that the fact that the expenditures
were incurred in order to comply with the law did not affect their nature as capital expenditures or currently deductible expenses. Bancshares,388 F.2d at 187; Transamerica,
254 F. Supp. at 508.
36. Although Gravois was cited as authority by the court in each case, the factual
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closer scrutiny, however, it is apparent that the courts might reasonably
have found that what had really occurred was a pro rata corporate division which resulted in the same shareholders holding their investment
in the original proportions in an altered corporate form. This conforms
to the fundamental characteristics of a reorganization. 37 From this
perspective, there had been no true divestiture of assets by the taxpayer
corporations. The courts could well have concluded that this change
in corporate structure was the very essence rather than a mere incident
of the transactions. Such a finding would have required that the expenses of the reorganization be capitalized. The point, of course, is not
that either conclusion is significantly more compelling than the other,
but that both are entirely defensible. Judicial inconsistency and consequent uncertainty for the corporate tax planner are therefore inevitable.
The most recent case employing this analogy approach, Bilar Tool
and Die Corp. v. Commissioner,3 8 involved a non-pro rata corporate
separation. Friction between the corporation's two coequal shareholders led the board of directors to adopt a resolution calling for "a plan
of reorganization" whereby the assets of the business would be divided
equally between the shareholders. 39 The corporation thereafter
formed a subsidiary and exchanged approximately one half of its assets
for all of the stock of the newly organized corporation. This stock
was then distributed to one of the shareholders in exchange for all
of his stock in the original corporation.40
The Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion, found that although the
transaction might qualify as a reorganization under section 368 (a) (1)
(D) of the Code,4 ' the corporation had "acquired nothing that would
situations were substantially different from that in Gravois. In Gravois the transaction
was a non-pro rata distribution in termination of a shareholder's interest. See notes 1921 supra and accompanying text. In Bancshares and Transamerica, by contrast, there
was no retirement of shares and the distribution was pro rata. See 388 F.2d at 186;
254 F. Supp. at 506.
37. See Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202 (1942).
38. 530 F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'g 62 T.C. 213 (1974).
39. 530 F.2d at 710-11. The corporation separation apparently conformed to a
non-pro rata type D reorganization. Id. at 713; see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)

(1)(D).
40. The parties stipulated that all of the events pursuant to the resolution of the
board of directors were "part of a single unified plan," and that the taxpayer had incurred legal and accounting fees of $11,500 "in connection with the plan." 530 F.2d
at 709-10.
41. 62 T.C. 213, 220 (1974). The court indicated that the term "reorganization"
as used in this context is conclusory. That is, its application to describe a transaction
simply denotes that the court has concluded it "affected [sic] a change in the corporate
structure for the benefit of future operations." Id. If the transaction effects such a
change, it is denominated a reorganization; however, analysis of the transaction must precede its denomination, and not vice versa.

Vol. 1976:941]

LEGAL EXPENSE DEDUCTIBILITY

be of any benefit to it in its future operations. ' 42 The dominant aspect
of the transaction, according to the court, was "a partial liquidation
in the sense that [the original corporation] divested itself of part of
its assets in return for part of its stock and continued in business on
were held dea reduced basis."43 The attendant expenses, therefore,
4
ductible under Transamericaand GeneralBancshares.1
The Sixth Circuit reversed,4 5 finding that the Tax Court's conclusion that the corporation had obtained no future benefit was "clearly
Quoting extensively from testimony indicating that the
erroneous."4
division was necessary for the continued existence of the taxpayer's
business, the court stated:
When a plan of reorganization of a corporation which is going "down
the drain" produces two viable corporations by the equal division of
the assets of the doomed (or threatened) corporation, we believe value
has clearly been added to the capital structure of both the original
corporation and the successor corporations. Such was the dominant
purpose and result of the reorganization plan as this record clearly
establishes. 47
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 218-21. See notes 28-35 supra and accompanying text. Five members
of the Tax Court dissented, stating that "the ultimate purpose and effect of the various
steps in the plan were to bring about a reorganization of the form and operations of
the business." 62 T.C. at 222.
45. 530 F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1976).
46. Id. at 710.
47. Id. at 711, citing Mills Estate. Further on, the court added that
[the attorney fees] were of benefit to the whole of the original corporation
because they served the purpose of terminating the dissension which threatened
to wreck it. They were likewise of capital benefit to both successor corporations, since they were essential to making -both possible. Id. at 713.
Similar reasoning was applied in Thompson & Green Mach. Co. v. United States, 327
F. Supp. 1128 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), where the court, in disallowing deduction for expenses of a non-pro rata corporate separation whereby subsidiary stock was distributed
to shareholders in exchange for stock and notes of the parent, said:
It appears . . . from . . . all of the evidence that the motivating and dominant

reason for the recited activities was the maintaining of the Caterpillar franchise and its continued value to [the parent]. If this is so, then the corporate
reorganization was effected "for the improvement of a tangible or intangible
asset." Id. at 1130.
Thompson is distinguishable from Bilar in that in Thompson the preservation of a specific asset was involved-a sales franchise-rather than preservation of the existence of
the entire business, and the court deemed the expenses to have been made for the "improvement" of that asset by making it more secure. This would not be the case in the
usual non-pro rata separation undertaken to effectuate a split of shareholder interests
and not to protect any specific asset. Similarly, in E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v.
United States, 432 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1970), the court denied deduction of expenses
of a complex corporate realignment involving a divisive reorganization carried out to
comply with the antitrust laws on the ground that "the expenditures resulted in a benefit
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Unlike the courts in Transamerica and General Bancshares,"8
then, the Sixth Circuit viewed the transaction from the standpoint of
both the original taxpayer corporation and the newly formed corporate
entity. From this perspective, the scope of business activity remained
the same, and the proportionate interest of each shareholder in the
whole enterprise was likewise unchanged. A strong argument can be
made, however, that it was inappropriate for the court to look at the
impact of the transaction on both corporations. After the separation,
each shareholder held stock in a corporation which was fundamentally
different from that in which he had previously had an interest. Instead
of owning a half interest in all of the assets, each now owned a total
interest in one half of the assets; company-shareholder relations had
been fundamentally altered. It would have been equally reasonable,
therefore, for the court to emphasize the lack of formal continuity between the two corporations and to analyze the transaction solely from
the viewpoint of the original firm.
The court's decision to take the broader view can perhaps be
traced to the constraints imposed by the analogy approach. The original corporation had undergone a substantial change-the withdrawal
of one of its two shareholders, accompanied by a divestiture of half
of its assets. Viewed from the perspective of the original corporation
alone, then, the situation resembles that presented in Gravois. 9 In
both cases a shareholder terminated his investment in the company,
in both the corporations found it advantageous to cooperate with the
shareholder in this goal, and in both the net result of the transaction
was that the corporation continued in business with reduced assets. It
would seem, therefore, that the most appropriate result would have
been to follow Gravois and allow the deduction of attendant expenses
by analogy to a complete liquidation.50
to the taxpayer which could be expected to produce returns for many years in the future." Id. at 1059.
48. See notes 28-35 supra and accompanying text. The court attempted to distinguish Bancshares and Transamericaon the ground that in those cases the divestiture of
the assets was compelled. 530 F.2d at 712. However, it appears to be an established
principle that the mere fact that an expenditure is compelled by law does not affect its
characterization as either capital or ordinary and necessary. See E.I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1059 (3d Cir. 1970); Woolrich Woolen
Mills v. United States, 289 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1961); RKO Theaters, Inc. v. United
States, 163 F. Supp. 598 (Ct. Cl. 1958). This principle was expressly recognized in both
Transamerica, 254 F. Supp. 504, 508 (N.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir.
1968), and Bancshares,388 F.2d 184, 187 (8th Cir. 1968).
49. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
50. The court did, however, attempt to distinguish Gravois on the rather spurious
ground that there the company's president and major shareholder was retiring and
wished to withdraw his capital, whereas "[n]o such retirement and withdrawal of capital
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The court was understandably reluctant to draw an analogy to a
complete liquidation, however, since the transaction had the effect of
allowing the original corporation to remain in business. It was suggested in the opinion that an expenditure which averts a threat to a

business' existence must of necessity produce a benefit which extends
beyond the taxable year and, therefore, should be capitalized. 51 The

court's dilemma is apparent. Had the analogy approach been applied
in the most straightforward fashion, that is, from the viewpoint of the
original corporation alone, the Gravois reasoning would have dictated

the analysis and result. That result, however, would have been inconsistent with the court's view of the realities of the transaction. The
only way to reconcile the desired result with the use of the analogy

approach was to consider the status of both corporations and draw the
more tenuous reorganization analogy.
Curiously, the court's strongly held view of the nature of the
transaction is contrary to a line of cases which has generally held that ex-

penses incurred to defend a threatened business are ordinary and necessary. 2 For example, in the earliest case to consider the specific issue
of deductibility of legal fees incurred in connection with a corporate
stock redemption, General Pencil Co.,53 the Tax Court held that fees
paid to an attorney in order to protect a corporation from a sharehold-

er's threat to throw the firm into receivership were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.5 4

Had the Bilar court been

is involved in our instant case and there is both beneficial change and improvement
shown in the instant plan." 530 F.2d at 712. The court also seemed to be influenced
by the fact that in Gravois the parties styled their plan a "liquidation" while in Bilar
they called it a "reorganization." Id.
51. Id. at 713.
52. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933):
A lawsuit affecting the safety of a business may happen once in a lifetime. The counsel fees may be so heavy that repetition is unlikely. None the
less, the expense is an ordinary one because we know from experience that
payments for such a purpose, whether the amount is large or small, are the
common and accepted means of defense against attack.
53. 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 603 (1944).
54. Id. at 604. In this, the earliest decision squarely on point, the court allowed
a deduction in a case where the corporate capital structure was changed by a repurchase
of the corporation's own stock, and the corporation had thereby obtained a benefit similar to that envisaged by the Bilar court, apparently without a corporate contraction. In
so doing the court did not utilize the analogy to complete liquidation, nor did it consider
the repurchased stock to be a capital asset in the hands of the repurchasing corporation.
A few cases have gone so far as to recognize allowability of a deduction for the
repurchase payment itself when the existence of the business is threatened. The most
notable of these is Five Star Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1966).
There a corporation owned a valuable patent right. In order to retain that right and
to protect itself against liquidation as a result of a receivership suit by one of its two
50 percent shareholders, the corporation repurchased that shareholder's stock. The court
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influenced by this line of authority, it might not have found the more
obvious analogy to a complete liquidation so incongruous with the fact
that the transaction was undertaken to preserve the corporate existence.
What emerges once again is not a strong sense that the court's
result was clearly right or wrong, but a realization that a number of
viewpoints are supportable. The Bilar case, therefore, is perhaps most
significant as another indication of the inadequacy of the analogy approach. Since the judicial treatment of expenses has been less than
consistent under this approach, the courts in future cases should not
hesitate to attempt new analyses. In fact, another method of dealing
with these kinds of situations has already been developed and has arguably been sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Prior to suggesting a
new approach, therefore, it is first necessary to examine this second
line of cases and to determine whether the Supreme Court has settled
the issue.
1H.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

"STRAIGHT REDEMPTION" CASES

In a second line of cases, the courts have viewed a corporation's
redeemed stock as a capital asset and the expenses of the redemption
as simply a part of the cost of acquiring that asset.55 Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner56 is an often cited and typical case
held that the entire amount paid to purchase the stock was deductible on the ground
that it was necessary to protect the business, id. at 727, since liquidation would have
been inevitable otherwise. This did not result in acquisition of a capital asset, but was
merely an expenditure which would permit the corporation to use its assets for income
production. Id. Cf. United States v. Smith, 418 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1969) (deductibility of payment made to discharge debt of shareholder assumed by corporation dependent
upon whether payment is determined to be a constructive dividend). Contra,White Star
Drive-In Laundry, Inc. v. United States, 1972-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9683 (N.D. Ill. 1972),
in which the court rejected the taxpayer corporation's attempt to deduct the amount paid
to redeem 50 percent of its own stock from one of its two shareholders in settlement
of a suit for dissolution, saying:
The Circuit Court suit in question sought the dissolution of the corporation,
the appointment of a receiver, and a distribution of the proceeds from a sale
of the assets. It is difficult to imagine a claim which is more capital in
nature. Id. at 86,586.
The Fifth Circuit later limited its Five Star holding to "situations where a payment to
purchase a capital asset, though dapital in nature, is necessary to the taxpayer's survival."
Jim Walter Corp. v. United States, 498 F.2d 631, 639 (5th Cir. 1974). See also H & G
Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 653, 657 (3d Cir. 1974).
55. These cases have been termed "Straight Redemption" cases by two authors, D.
HEwnrrz, supra note 4, at 543; DeCastro, supra note 4, at 227, and "Simple Acquisition"
cases by another, Cohen, supra note 6, at 444.
56. 36 T.C. 173 (1961); accord, Annabelle Candy Co., 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 873
(1961), aff'd on other grounds, 314 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1962).
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adopting this approach. A corporation incurred legal expenses in the
development of a plan to eliminate friction among its three shareholders by redeeming the shares held by two of them. The Tax Court
disallowed the corporation's deduction of the legal fee as an ordinary
and necessary business expense, stating, without citation of authority,
that the fee was "a capital expenditure which should have been treated
as part of the cost of the stock purchased."5 7 That the redemption

was motivated by a desire to eliminate friction among the shareholders
was deemed immaterial. 58
The argument that a corporation purchases an "asset" when it reacquires its own stock in a redemption transaction seems unsound.
From a financial accounting standpoint, when a corporation redeems
stock the shares are generally either cancelled or held as treasury stock."

In the first case, they go out of existence entirely; in the second, while
they remain on the corporate books as issued, they are no longer con-

sidered outstanding.60 In either event they add nothing of value to
57. 36 T.C. at 183. There is broad support available for this proposition. Its earliest expression apparently came in a brief administrative pronouncement, O.D. 852, 4
CuM. BULL. 286, which provided in its entirety:
The expenses, exclusive of the purchase price, incurred by a company in purchasing its own stock for the purpose of retirement or holding as treasury
stock, are not such expenses as can be classified as ordinary and necessary
expenses incurred in carrying on he business, and hence are not deductible
from gross income. These expenses are to be considered part of the purchase
price of the stock retired.
O.D. 852 was superseded by Rev. Rul. 69-561, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 25, which, however,
applied the same principle, holding that brokerage fees paid by a corporation in purchasing its own stock "are part of the purchase price of the stock so acquired," and citing
Atzingen. The Service took a different approach but reached the same result in Rev.
Rul. 67-125, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 31, 32, where it ruled that expenses of planning a redemption are capital in nature because they "operate to change the capital structure for
a period of indefinite duration." Subsequently in Rev. Rul. 74-266, 1974-1 Cum. BULL.
73, 74, the Service cited both of these rulings in holding that costs of redemption of
preferred stock are not chargeable against earnings and profits, but rather are "properly
chargeable to capital account" under section 312(e).
The principle received its earliest judicial recognition in Commerce Photo Print
Corp., 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 386 (1947). There, as a result of stockholder friction,
the corporation redeemed all the shares of one of two shareholders in a transaction that
could conceivably have qualified as either a non-pro rata redemption or a corporate contraction. The Tax Court rejected the corporation's claim to deduction of the related attorneys' fees because "[the amount] paid in connection with petitioner's acquisition of
its own shares of stock

. . .

was an expenditure for the acquisition of property. ....
"

Id. at 392; accord, Southern Eng'r & Metal Prods. Corp., 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 93
(1950); cf. Colonial Eng'r Co., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1476 (1963) (court assumed
that expenses of redeeming stock were "a part of the purchase price").
58. 36 T.C. at 183.
59. See 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PrvATE CORPORATIONS

§ 5088 at 38 (M.Wolf rev. ed. 1971).
60. See id.
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the corporation, representing merely a balance sheet adjustment of the
corporate capital structure, and listing them as an asset may be not

only inaccurate, but also misleading. 61 Secondly, under the 1954
Code, a corporation does not recognize gains or losses resulting from
dealings in its own stock,6 2- thus indicating that, for tax purposes, such
transactions are not to be considered as typical acquisitions of capital
assets. 63 Finally, cases such as Atzingen have, of course, virtually disregarded the principal line of circuit court authority rejecting the notion
that redeemed stock is a capital asset and requiring that the dominant
aspect of the transaction as a whole be used to determine the deduct-

ibility of attendant expenses.64
In spite of these arguments against the Atzingen approach, it is
the only case on this topic to receive mention by the Supreme Courtalbeit for a limited purpose.65 It is necessary, therefore, to examine
the Court's decisions in the area to determine whether the deductibility
question has effectively been settled.
In Woodward v. Commissioner6 6 and United States v. Hilton Ho-

tels Corp.,0 7 the Supreme Court applied the "origin and character" test

developed in United States v. Gilmore68 to determine whether costs
61. See SEC Regulation S-X, Rule 3-14, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-14 (1976):
Reacquired shares not retired shall be shown separately as a deduction from
capital shares, or from the total of capital shares and other stockholders' equity,
or from stockholders' equity, at either par or stated value, or. cost, as circumstances require.
See also AICPA, ACCOUNTING OPINIONS OF THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD No. 6
at 40 (October, 1965).
62. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1032:
(a) Nonrecognition of Gain or Loss-No gain or loss shall be recognized to a
corporation on the receipt of money or other property in exchange for
stock (including treasury stock) of such corporation.
63. There was, however, some basis for this notion under pre-1954 Code law. See
generally 2 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 191-95 (1973).
64. See notes 9-47 supra and accompanying text. This situation can conceivably
be attributed to the manner in which the cases are indexed. For example, in Mertens'
treatise, Atzingen is cited for the proposition that "the cost of . . . redeeming capital
stock" must be capitalized, while Gravois furnishes authority for the proposition that expenses of a "partial liquidation" may be deductible. Compare J. MERTENS, supra note
5, 25.35 n.53 with id. n.72.3. The cases are likewise grouped under different headings
in the CCH and Prentice-Hall services.
65. See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 578 (1970). Atzingen was cited
as general support for the limited proposition that the expenses incurred in determining
the price at which stock will be redeemed must be capitalized. Id.
66. 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
67. 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
68. 372 U.S. 39 (1963). In Gilmore, a taxpayer had successfully defended against
his wife's assertions of a community property interest in assets which provided him with
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incurred in appraising the stock of dissenting shareholders are current
expenses or capital expenditures. In Woodward the stockholders of

a corporation which was about to expire voted to extend the corporate
existence perpetually. A minority stockholder dissented, and under
state law was entitled to have his shares purchased by the stockholders
voting for renewal. The parties, however, could not agree on the value

of his stock, and appraisal litigation ensued. The majority shareholders subsequently claimed a deduction under section 212 of the Code 9
for the legal expenses incurred as a result of this litigation.
The Supreme Court found that the "origin" of these expenses was
the purchase of the dissenter's shares by the individual taxpayers and
therefore applied the rule that "the cost of acquisition . . . of . . .

property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year" is
a capital expenditure. 70 The costs of litigation were deemed analogous
to the cost of negotiating a purchase price for the minority stock which,
71
the Court said, would no doubt have been a capital expenditure.

Since Woodward involved the acquisition of the stock of one individual
by another individual, its result appears sound. It should be emphasized, however, that the case did not involve the purchase of stock by

a corporation or a change in corporate organization.
In Hilton Hotels, however, the Court faced a factual situation more

closely analogous to a redemption or partial liquidation and used Woodmuch of his income. If the wife had obtained the asserted interest in certain stock the
husband would have been in danger of losing corporate positions which were his principal sources of income; additionally, he might have lost his automobile dealer franchises
if certain of the charges made by his wife had been proven. He was not allowed to
deduct his attorney's fees under section 23(a) (2) of the 1939 Code (predecessor of section 212), on the ground that the expenditures were personal in nature rather than related
to income-producing activity or property. The taxpayer's purpose of protecting his income-producing assets and positions was not considered to be relevant to allowance of
the deduction. Rather, the Court established the so-called "origin and character" test:
mhe origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was
incurred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of whether the expense was "business" or
"personal" and hence whether it is deductible or not under § 23(a)(2). Id.
at 49.
Since the origin of the claim with respect to which the legal fees were incurred was the
marital relationship, the expenses were held to be personal in nature, even though the
result of the taxpayer's losing his claim may well have been the loss of considerable income.
69. In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year:
(1) for the production or collection of income;
(2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held
for the production of income. . . . INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 212 (emphasis
added).
70. 397 U.S. at 575-76, quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1958).
71. 397 U.S. at 577-78.
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ward as a basis for analysis of the transaction. The dissenters in this
case were shareholders of the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corporation who
objected to the corporation's proposed merger with Hilton, which already
owned 90 percent of the Waldorf stock. Once again, litigation was
required in order to appraise the dissenters' shares. Hilton claimed
a deduction under section 162 of the Code 72 for legal and other expenses incurred in connection with this procedure. 71
The Supreme Court regarded Hilton as simply a variation of the
Woodward situation, stating that it "presents a similar question involving the tax treatment of appraisal litigation expenses. '74 The origin
of these expenses was the acquisition by Hilton of the Waldorf stock;
therefore, capitalization was required. Again, the Court's opinion appears sound if the transaction is perceived as involving nothing more
than the purchase by the taxpayer corporation of shares of another corporation. Under such an analysis, the case has only limited applicability to a transaction involving only one corporation. Even if the transaction in Hilton is viewed as a corporate merger, perhaps a more realistic approach, the Court reached the correct result in holding that the
attendant expenses must be capitalized. 75 This result likewise has little
effect on the existing law since the expenses of corporate mergers and
other reorganizations are generally capital expenditures. 7 6
The .argument that Woodward and Hilton require capitalization
of stock redemption and partial liquidation expenses,77 therefore, is
undercut by the substantial factual differences between those cases and
72. See note 2 supra.
73. 397 U.S. at 582.
74. Id. at 581. The Court apparently found insignificant the following factual differences: (1) Woodward involved a purchase of stock by individual shareholders from
other individual shareholders, while Hilton involved payment by a corporation to dissenting shareholders of the corporation being merged into it; and (2) The basic underlying
transaction in Woodward was the extension of the corporate charter while the transaction in Hilton was a corporate merger of a subsidiary into its parent. The Court did
detect a distinction between the cases in that, under state law in Hilton, title to the dissenters' stock passed to the majority as soon as they formally registered their dissent
to the merger, whereas in Woodward passage of title did not occur until after the price
was settled in the appraisal proceeding. Id. at 583. This distinction, however, was not
found substantial enough to require a different result. Id. at 584.
75. The district court determined that the transaction was essentially a corporate
merger, but found that the appraisal expenses were incurred independent of the reorganization. It therefore did not require capitalization of these expenses. Hilton Hotels
v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd, 410 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1969),
rev'd, 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
76. See note 23 supra.
77. See 17-5th BNA TAx MGT. PORTsOLOs A-94 (1974); Cohen, supra note 6, at
472-82.
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such transactions. Reasonably read, the Supreme Court cases simply
reaffirm the settled rules that the expenses of acquiring stock in a corporation (other than the taxpayer corporation) must be capitalized
and that the expenses of a corporate reorganization must be capitalized.
This interpretation of these cases is supported both by the limited purpose for which the Court cited Atzingen 78 and by the fact that in Bilar,
the most recent case in the redemption/partial liquidation area, 79 the
Tax Court found little guidance in the Supreme Court decisions80 and
the Sixth Circuit on appeal failed even to mention them.
IV.

AN ALTERNATIVB APPROACH

Since the current case law has not set forth a comprehensive
scheme for determining the proper tax treatment of the legal expenses
incurred in a partial liquidation, stock redemption, or corporate separation, it would be appropriate for the courts to explore alternative approaches in future cases. As a foundation for doing so, the courts
should redirect their attention to the fundamental accounting concept
that costs are to be "matched" against the revenues which they pro81

duce.

On a superficial level, the suggested analysis is virtually indistinguishable from the analogy approach. In fact, the question of when
the benefits of a transaction would accrue was posed at least implicitly
in many of the cases discussed in the process of choosing the appropriate analogy. The critical distinction is one of focus. The results in
the analogy cases have depended on the court's overall perception of
the transaction. The relative emphasis to be given different aspects
of the transaction has been entirely discretionary and largely unpredictable. The analysis proposed here would require that the decision be
based instead on a single, functional criterion: a traditional accounting
determination of which year's revenues particular expenses should be
charged against. Admittedly, judicial flexibility would be sacrificed;
complex analysis such as that employed in Bilar would be precluded.
It is contended, however, that the significant gain in rational consistency would more than compensate for any constraints imposed on judicial discretion.
78. See note 65 supra.
79. Bilar Tool & Die Corp. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 213 (1974), rev'd, 530 F.2d
708 (6th Cir. 1976). See notes 38-47 supra and accompanying text.
80. "In [Woodward and Hilton] there was no question that the underlying litigation
or transaction was of a capital nature while our task here is to decide the underlying
character or nature of the transaction." 62 T.CAt 219.
81.

See note 8 supra.
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One effect of such a change in focus would be to facilitate the
establishment of definite, automatic procedures for treating expenses
incurred in fairly common transactions. Certainty of treatment is
clearly more desirable than purported rationality from the tax planner's
perspective. The cases discussed above, however, provide little basis
for formulating such rules of general applicability. An analysis of three
typical transactions will show the utility of the matching principle in
achieving a reasonable standardization in these types of cases.
A.

Stock Redemption

The most consistent results reached under the reorganization/
liquidation analogy approach have involved the deductibility of the expenses of a stock redemption. According to Gravois, a principal shareholder's retirement results in a "liquidation" of a portion of the firm,
and, therefore, the transaction is analogous to a complete liquidation
of the corporation. 2 It should be obvious, however, that an essential
element of a complete liquidation-the termination of the corporate
existence-is not present in the situation under consideration. This
fact largely undercuts the validity of the analogy since an important
reason for permitting the deduction of liquidation expenses is the need
to close out the firm's books. 83
In spite of the weakness of the analogy, it was concluded above
that the Gravois result is correct; 4 it should therefore be elevated to
the status of a general rule to be applied in all comparable cases. Such
certainty can be best achieved by discarding the inappropriate analogy
to a complete liquidation and by focusing on the essential elements
of the transaction. In this situation, the transaction can be broken
down into a distribution of corporate assets and a restructuring of capital to reflect the withdrawal of a shareholder from the business. s5 The
long-term impact of each of these elements should then be assessed.
As a logical matter, it is difficult to view the reduction in corporate assets
82. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
83. See note 6 supra.
84. See notes 22-26 supra and accompanying text.
85. The Tax Court's analysis of the stock redemption in Mills' Estate, Inc., 17 T.C.
910 (1951), rev'd in part, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953), began with a similar functional
breakdown of the transaction. The court then attempted to allocate the costs between
the capital expenditures required to produce a new capital structure and the ordinary expenses incurred in distributing corporate assets. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text. It was at this stage that the court experienced difficulty, having to estimate
roughly the proper allocation. See note 13 supra. Such problems of imprecision are
avoided under the analysis proposed in this Article, since the functional breakdown is
to be used only for generally evaluating the long-term impact of the whole transaction.
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resulting from the distribution as anything but a detriment to the company's long-term prospects. Likewise, the removal of a shareholder
and the restructuring of capital are not readily characterized as longterm corporate benefits.
These conclusions might be questioned in a situation in which the
redemption was undertaken to eliminate shareholder friction. This latter view cannot, however, form the basis of an argument requiring capitalization, for it would be directly contrary to the general rule that costs
incurred in eliminating a shareholder who poses a threat to the continuation of the business is a currently deductible expense. The rationale
is apparent: the elimination of an impediment at a single point in time
is far removed from the traditional concept of an asset of continuing
value. Since neither of the essential elements of a stock redemption
can be viewed as conferring a long-term benefit on the corporation,
the expenses incurred in undertaking this change should, in every case,
be matched against current income and treated as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
B.

PartialLiquidation

Similar considerations apply in the partial liquidation context. The
main components of a section 346 partial liquidation are a distribution
of assets and an alteration of the corporation's capital structure in the
form of a reduction in the number of shares outstanding. 8 According
to Mills Estate, the latter feature compels the conclusion that the expenses of a partial liquidation must be capitalized, on the theory that
87
a new capital structure is a long-term corporate asset.
This approach grossly overstates the value of the future benefits
against which the present transaction costs might be matched. The
new corporate structure itself cannot be viewed as an asset of lasting
value; rather, the restructuring confers on the corporation only the
ephemeral benefit of being enabled to clear an existing hurdle and
continue in business. The problem is compounded by the inadequate
emphasis given to the distribution of assets in Mills Estate. When the
detriment inherent in a contraction of corporate activities is weighed
86. Section 346(a) provides that:
: . . a distribution shall be treated as in partial liquidation of a corporation
if(1) the distribution is one of a series of distributions in redemption of
all of the stock of the corporation pursuant to a plan; or
(2) the distribution is not essentially equivalent to a dividend, is in redemption of a part of the stock of the corporation pursuant to a plan ....
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 346(a).
87. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
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against whatever positive aspects the reorganization might have, it is
difficult to view the entire transaction as anything more than a substantial and largely uncompensated expenditure necessary to meet current
exigencies. An examination of the elements of the transaction from
a matching perspective thus suggests a general rule of deductibility for
the expenses of a partial liquidation.8"
C.

CorporateSeparation

Under the reorganization/liquidation analogy approach, the treatment of the expenses of a corporate separation, a transaction in which
the corporation transfers part of its assets to a newly formed corporation
and distributes the shares of the new corporation to its own shareholders, apparently depends upon whether or not the distribution is made
on a pro rata basis. In Transamerica and General Bancshares, the
courts allowed the deduction of the expenses of a pro rata separation, 89
while the cost of the non-pro rata split in Bilar had to be capitalized. 90
Under the approach suggested herein, the result would be precisely the opposite. Corporate separations involve the same two elements present in partial liquidations and stock redemptions: a corporate distribution and a change in the corporate capital structure. In
fact, the analysis of a non-pro rata separation is essentially the same
as that of a stock redemption. In each situation, the overall impact
of the transaction is detrimental to the corporation since the depletion
of assets will normally outweigh any benefit resulting from the change
in capital structure necessary to reflect the withdrawal of a shareholder. Even assuming an overall beneficial effect, that benefit must
again be characterized as immediate rather than continuing.
On the other hand, it would appear that the treatment of the expenses of a partial liquidation is determinative of the issue with regard
to the expenses of a pro rata separation. In both situations, the original
corporation suffers a substantial depletion of its assets. The benefits
derived from the reorganization aspect of the separation, however, are
considerable. As in all corporate reorganizations, the shareholders retain their proportionate investments in the same enterprise, but within a
new corporate framework.9 1 It can reasonably be assumed that the
change was brought about because the new corporate structure was
deemed more advantageous to the business as a whole. The preferred
88.
89.
90.
91.

See
See
See
See

note 27 supra.
notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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new structure not only enables the enterprise to continue, but enables
it to continue with improved prospects for success. It therefore confers
on the corporation a continuing benefit, the attendant expenses of
which are properly matched against future income.
V.

CONCLUSION

The determination of the proper tax treatment of legal expenses
incurred by corporations undertaking a partial liquidation, stock redemption, or corporate separation has resulted in conflicting lines of
authority and conflicting decisions within the dominant line of authority. Since the treatment such expenses will receive may, affect a corporation's decision to engage in one of these transactions, it is important
that some certainty be brought to the area.
Thus far, most courts have attempted to analyze these transactions
by drawing an analogy to either a reorganization or a liquidation. This
approach, however, has led to an oversimplification of the analysis, as
evidenced by the failure of the courts in many cases to make a realistic
appraisal of the functional components of the transaction.
It is suggested that certainty of result can be better achieved by
assessing the essential elements of each transaction in order to determine the overall impact which the change will have on corporate operations. Capitalization of expenses will thus be required only in those
instances in which the true long-range benefit to the corporation derived from the transaction offsets whatever detrimental effect it may
have. In this way, the treatment of these expenses will more accurately reflect the matching concept which underlies the expense/capital
expenditure distinction for federal income tax purposes.

